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Abstract 
Understanding the nature of unemployment has been a key research goal for economists since 
the inception of modern macroeconomics. One key feature of unemployment is that the social 
impact of unemployment differs depending on the duration of unemployment spells. 
However, the very policies that were created to protect workers from the harm associated 
with unemployment were found to lengthen the duration of unemployment. While 
unemployment has generally been recognized as an important issue in the Arab countries of 
the Middle East, very little research has been done on unemployment duration. This paper 
examines the basic coverage rates of the main form of social protection for Palestinian 
workers: the Palestinian Labor Law of 2000. We then examine the impact of this law on men 
and women separately, with a special focus on the impact of maternity benefits on women’s 
unemployment duration. This paper finds that the services sector receives substantially more 
benefits than any other sector, and that service sectors workers are the slowest to find work 
after becoming unemployed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ  
  
ﺒﻃ كاردإ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺖﺤﺒﺻأ ﺪﻘﻟ ﺚﻳﺪѧﺤﻟا ﻲѧﻠﻜﻟا دﺎѧﺼﺘﻗﻻا ﻢѧﻠﻋ ةﺄѧﺸﻧ ﺬѧﻨﻣ ﻢﻬﺛﺎѧﺤﺑأ ﻲѧﻓ دﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻا ءﺎﻤﻠﻋ ىﺪﻟ ﻲﺴﻴﺋر فﺪه ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ةﺮهﺎﻇ ﺔﻌﻴ .
 ﺔѧﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا تﺎѧﺑﻮﻧ ةﺪѧﻣ ﻰѧﻠﻋ ﺪѧﻤﺘﻌﻳ ﻲﻋﺎѧﻤﺘﺟﻻا ﺎهﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ فﻼﺘﺧا نأ ﻲه ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ةﺮهﺎﻈﻟ ﺔﻴﺴﻴﺋﺮﻟا تﺎﻤﺴﻟا ﻦﻣو . ﺪѧﻘﻓ ،ﻚѧﻟذ ﻦѧﻣ ﻢﻏﺮѧﻟا ﻰѧﻠﻋو
 ﻤﺤﻟ ﺎﻬﻌѧﺿو ﻢѧﺗ ﻲѧﺘﻟا تﺎﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺪﻳﺪﻌﻟا نأ ﺪﺟُو ﺔѧﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ةﺮѧﺘﻓ ةدﺎѧﻳز ﻰѧﻟإ  تدأ ﺔѧﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ﺐﺣﺎѧﺼﺗ ﻲѧﺘﻟا راﺮѧﺿﻷا ﻦѧﻣ لﺎѧﻤﻌﻟا ﺔѧﻳﺎ.  ﻲѧﻓو
 دﺪѧﻋ ءاﺮѧﺟإ ﻢﺗ ﻪﻧأ ﻻإ ،ﻂﺳوﻷا قﺮﺸﻟا ﺔﻘﻄﻨﻤﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟا لوﺪﻟا ﻲﻓ ،مﻮﻤﻌﻟا ﻪﺟو ﻰﻠﻋ ،ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ﺔﻴﻀﻗ ﺔﻴﻤهأ يﺪﻣ كاردإ ﻪﻴﻓ ﻢﺗ يﺬﻟا ﺖﻗﻮﻟا
ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ةﺪﻣ نﺄﺸﺑ ثﺎﺤﺑﻷا ﻦﻣ اﺪﺟ ﻞﻴﺌﺿ.  ﺺѧﺤﻔﺑ ﺚѧﺤﺒﻟا اﺬѧه مﻮﻘﻳو ﺔѧﻳﺎﻤﺤﻟا مﺪѧﻘﻳ يﺬѧﻟا ﻲѧﺴﻴﺋﺮﻟا بﻮﻠѧﺳﻸﻟ ﺔﻴѧﺳﺎﺳﻷا ﺔѧﻴﻄﻐﺘﻟا تﻻﺪѧﻌﻣ
ﻦﻴﻴﻨﻴﻄﺴﻠﻔﻟا لﺎﻤﻌﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا : مﺎﻌﻟ ﻲﻨﻴﻄﺴﻠﻔﻟا ﻞﻤﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻗ2000 . ﻲѧﻠﻋ نﻮﻧﺎѧﻘﻟا اﺬѧه ﺮﻴﺛﺄѧﺗ ﺺѧﺤﻔﺑ مﻮѧﻘﻧ ﺎѧﻨﻧﺈﻓ ،ﺚѧﺤﺒﻟا اﺬه لﻼﺧ ﻦﻣو
 ﺔѧﻣﻮﻣﻷا ﺎѧﻳاﺰﻣ ﺮѧﺛأ ﻰѧﻠﻋ ﺰѧﻴآﺮﺘﻟا ﻦѧﻣ ﺪѧﻳﺰﻤﻟا ءﺎѧﻄﻋإ ﻊѧﻣ ،ةﺪﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻼآ ثﺎﻧﻹاو رﻮآﺬﻟا  ﺔѧﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ةﺮѧﺘﻓ لﻼѧﺧ ةأﺮѧﻤﻟا ﻰѧﻠﻋ.  اﺬѧه ﺞﺘﻨﺘѧﺴﻳو
 نوﺮѧﺒﺘﻌﻳ تﺎﻣﺪѧﺨﻟا عﺎѧﻄﻗ لﺎѧﻤﻋ نأ ﺎѧﻤآ ،ﺮѧﺧﺁ عﺎѧﻄﻗ يأ ﻦѧﻣ ﺮѧﺜآأ تاﺰﻴﻤﻤﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻦﻣ ﺔﻳﺮهﻮﺟ ةرﻮﺼﺑ ﺪﻴﻔﺘﺴﻳ تﺎﻣﺪﺨﻟا عﺎﻄﻗ نأ ﺚﺤﺒﻟا
ﻢﻬﺘﻔﻴﻇو ﺪﻘﻓ ﺪﻌﺑ ﺔﻌﻳﺮﺳ ﺔﻘﻳﺮﻄﺑ ﻞﻤﻋ دﺎﺠﻳإ ﻢﻬﻨﻜﻤﻳ ﻦﻳﺬﻟا داﺮﻓﻷا ﻞﻗا.  
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the nature of unemployment has been a key research goal for economists since 
the inception of modern macroeconomics. One key feature of unemployment is that the social 
impact of unemployment differs depending on whether or not unemployment is long term. 
While unemployment has widely been recognized as an important issue in the Middle East, 
scant research has been done on unemployment duration. This paper will begin to fill the gap 
in the literature by examining the relationship between employment regulations, gender and 
unemployment duration in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
Labor market regulations are widely considered to affect unemployment duration. This 
phenomenon has been widely studied throughout the world, but especially in continental 
Europe. While the US had higher unemployment than Europe during the 1960s and early 
1970s, since that time Europe (more precisely, Southern Europe) has witnessed persistently 
high unemployment, even when the economy had been growing. Most of the literature 
attempts to get a better understanding of the precise role that labor market rigidities have had 
in explaining these high unemployment rates. Nickell (1997) attempts to address the 
differences in the US and European experiences directly. He reviews the role of a whole 
series of institutional differences (not merely employment protection legislation) on the 
divergent experiences of the US and Europe. Saint-Paul (2004) focuses more directly on the 
role of labor market reforms undertaken by some European countries to explain why they 
have been able to decrease their unemployment rates, while other European countries remain 
mired in high unemployment. 
These socioeconomic characteristics can also have a differential impact on unemployment 
duration for women and men. Once a person is unemployed, the duration of the 
unemployment spell depends on those socioeconomic characteristics. The differential 
impact—if it exists—has not been studied in Palestine. Aranki and Daoud (2006) studied 
unemployment duration in Palestine, however, their study stopped short of identifying gender 
differences. In general, median duration has ranged from a low of five months in early 2000 
to a high of nearly 16 months in 2002. This is quite a high figure, but since it is a weighted 
average with a small weight for females, the duration for females might be even higher. 
Schooling, age, ability, gender, locality type, and political stability are all but a few of the 
variables that affect unemployment duration, and their impact will be studied for males and 
females separately.  
The second Intifada has increased unemployment incidence and duration; the increase came 
as a direct consequence of closing off the Israeli labor market to Palestinian workers, and 
indirectly as a result of reduced domestic demand for workers resulting from reduced 
economic activity. The downturn in economic activity was cushioned by international 
assistance and donor aid. A program for female headed households was started in 2005 to aid 
those individuals who lost their jobs.  However, this program came to an end soon after the 
elections which brought Hamas to take control of the government. The developments that 
took place in 2006 dealt a severe blow to living conditions, more so for women than for men. 
Previous spells have been directly related to access to Israeli labor markets where women are 
under-represented; the 2006 spell was different in the sense that most females were public 
sector workers and they were the greatest sufferers from the suspension of wage payments. 
Duration dependence is typically thought to be negative, and this was the case for 
unemployed Palestinians in general (Aranki and Daoud 2006). It is not clear whether this 
would be the case for both sexes. Tansel and Tasci (2004) found that the probability of 
finding a job does not change with elapsed time in unemployment for females, but that the 
hazard function is u shaped for men. There are several reasons why duration dependence is 
found to be positive or negative; Serneels (2001) points to unemployment benefits, active 
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labor market policies, segmented labor markets, and business cycle effects as possible 
explanations for duration non-dependence.  
The findings of this study will help policy makers identify the factors that are responsible for 
reducing unemployment durations. The study will also answer whether women have lower or 
higher exit rates from unemployment. If lower, then targeted policies should help females 
rejoin the ranks of the employed. In order to examine theses issues, the paper will utilize 
labor force surveys of the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics covering the entire span from 
1999–2004. Specifically, the analysis of unemployment duration will focus on the period 
from 2001 to 2004. 
We limit the study to the al-Aqsa intifada period in order to prevent any biases being 
introduced by this seismic shift in labor market dynamics. Aranki and Daoud (2006) show 
that exit rates from unemployment were cut in half during the intifada. By only including this 
time period, we will avoid contaminating the changes of time with changes that happened due 
to the labor market changes that happened at the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant empirical literature 
concerning the effects of labor market regulations on unemployment duration and how 
duration differs by gender. Section 3 discusses the empirical approach employed in this paper 
and highlights the source of the data used to test the empirical model. Section 4 presents the 
results from the estimated model and section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Empirical research on the determinants of the duration and occurrence of unemployment 
began to expand in the 1970s with the diffusion of micro-level household and firm data. 
These studies are generally of one of two types. The first examines the impact of specific 
labor market shocks that lead to dismissals. The effects of these dismissals on unemployment 
by demographic differences are then examined to understand how different workers are 
affected by aggregate and sectoral shocks. See (Ewing, et al. 2002; Katz 1986; Fallick 1993) 
for examples.  
The second examines how specific policies affect unemployment duration. These studies use 
both variation in policies between regions (e.g. US or European countries) and how these 
policies affect different types of workers based on coverage rules. For example, Meyer 
(1990) examines the impact of Unemployment Insurances (UI) benefits on the duration of 
unemployment by looking at benefit recipients in eight states. Tatsiramos (2006) and Bover, 
Arellano and Bentolila (2002) use data on the generosity of different European benefit 
systems and their reforms to understand how UI affects unemployment duration. These 
studies generally find that more generous UI benefits lead to less intensive search efforts, 
resulting in a lower probability of leaving unemployment during the early time-period. 
However, as the benefits become close to being exhausted, those with generous benefits work 
more aggressively to find a job vis-à-vis those with less generous benefits (Meyer 1990). 
Recent research has extended these studies to focus on not only the frequency of finding a 
job, but also on the type of job found by different job seekers over their unemployment spell 
(McCall 1997). Additionally, these studies have been extended beyond simply the two-state 
model mentioned earlier to estimate the effects of UI and other policies on entry, exit and 
even dropping out of the labor force, and how these impacts change over time (Hasan and De 
Broucker 1982; Corak 1996).  
Some studies have found important differences in unemployment duration by gender. The 
earliest studies of gender differentials focused on demonstrating and understanding how 
women were more susceptible to labor market shocks that result in unemployment than men 
were (Barret and Morgenstern 1974). Specifically, Maxwell and D’Amico (1986) found that 
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women in the US were three times as likely to still be unemployed after a job separation eight 
months later, when compared to men. Likewise, these authors find that women are likely to 
stay unemployed for up to three times longer than men.  In the late 1980s, unemployment 
duration research began employing the proportional hazard model and began to discover that 
the traditional finding about men and women was changing. Specifically, women are found to 
not have longer unemployment spells than men (De Boer and Seeborg 1989). 
To understand why this could have occurred, it is useful to consider two of the sources for 
differences in unemployment duration by gender. First, women and men still work in very 
different occupations and often, industries. If there is a differential impact of a shock across 
industries (in other words, it is not a true aggregate shock, but rather a sectoral shock), then 
there could be a different impact on men and women. Additionally, it has been noted 
(Maxwell and D’Amico 1986) that women may have a tendency to invest more in general 
training while men would invest more in firm specific training. If this is the case, it means 
that a firm is less likely to separate a male worker from his job, but also that female workers 
will spend less time unemployed if they are separated since their skills are more easily 
transferable. Thus, women could possibly no longer have a differentially long unemployment 
duration for a combination of factors related to both of these issues. First, the transformation 
of the US economy has generally been away from male-dominated industries and towards job 
and occupations that are more female dominated. Second, women are becoming more like 
men in the sense that they plan on having longer careers and more continuous work histories, 
thus they are more likely to invest in specific human capital. Ewing et al. (2002) confirms 
these trends in that for a given output shock, unemployment is both more pervasive and of 
longer duration for men than for women.  
Because the particular factors that affect this differential impact are specific to US structural 
changes and changing gender roles within the US society, it is useful to consider the 
experience in other countries to better understand the general phenomenon. In Australia, for 
example, Carroll (2006) uses the baseline hazard model to examine the factors affecting 
unemployment duration. The study finds that nearly all factors that increase wage offers 
(such as education) increase the probability of leaving unemployment. Using more detailed 
data Ollikainen (2003) uses a piecewise constant hazard model and a competing risk model to 
examine the factors that change the length of unemployment spells. Ollikainen stresses the 
importance of examining evidence from Nordic countries as they tend to be even more 
occupationally segregated than the US and the UK, where the bulk of this research had taken 
place. Ollikainen finds that while education shortens spells for women, the presence of young 
children increases unemployment duration. Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal (1995) examine the 
factors determining transitions both between unemployment and employment and 
unemployment and dropping out of the labor force in Spain. They find that while men have a 
higher probability of transitioning to work from unemployment, women have a higher 
probability of transitioning to being out of the labor force. They find that female-headed 
households have significantly longer unemployment spells and that unemployment benefits 
increase the likelihood that these women eventually transition out of the workforce and not 
into employment.  
There is also a relatively small literature that looks at unemployment duration in transition 
and developing countries. In a study that looks at unemployment in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Poland and Slovenia, Herzog (2000) examines the determinants of the probability 
of being made redundant by the transition reforms and the probability of exiting the work 
force. Using data from Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, Herzog finds that women 
were significantly more likely to suffer from the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s. Ham 
et al. (1999) also finds differentials by gender. Specifically, they find that while differences in 
characteristics by gender exist, the differences in outcomes arise from the differences in the 
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way these characteristics are treated by employers rather than the differences in the 
characteristics themselves.  
Drastic reforms were also taking place in developing countries at the time. Specifically, 
Galiani and Hopenhayn (2003) examine the differential effects of the structural reforms in 
Argentina during the 1990s. While not examining differential effects by gender, they did find 
that the reforms had unexpected effects on the occurrence of unemployment as the length of 
employment spells was substantially shortened. Finally, in one of the few studies on the 
Middle East, Sahin and Kizilirmak (2007) examine a new unemployment insurance benefit 
system that was implemented in Turkey in 2000. They find that men have shorter durations of 
receiving these benefits, as do workers with more experience and more schooling. In another 
study of unemployment duration in Turkey, Tansel and Tasci (2004) also find that women 
experience longer unemployment duration, but find that older women have longer 
unemployment duration, while more educated women have shorter spells. The effect of age 
and schooling are similar for men and women, but not identical. They also find that there is 
no duration dependence for women, while for men there is.  
In a rare study of unemployment duration in an Arab country Tunali and Assaad (1992) study 
workers in the construction sector in Egypt. They find there is a trade-off between wage 
expectations and unemployment duration for these workers—that those with higher wage 
expectations are likely to suffer longer unemployment spells. Aranki and Daoud (2006) 
examine unemployment duration from 1999 to 2003 in Palestine. They find that 
unemployment duration is longer in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and that 
demographic characteristics affect workers’ duration differently in the two regions. For 
example, education does not affect duration in the Gaza Strip, while more education actually 
lengthens unemployment spells in the West Bank.  
Beyond these few studies on Palestine, Egypt and Turkey, practically nothing is known about 
unemployment duration in the Middle East. This current project will partially fill that gap by 
providing a detailed analysis of unemployment duration by individual characteristics. 
Furthermore, since this paper will use data from the Palestinian labor market, we will be able 
to better measure the effect of shocks to an economy on unemployment duration. Previous 
studies have suffered from possible simultaneity issues since truly exogenous shocks are 
relatively rare. Those in Palestine, since they come in the form of external political 
restrictions, are not affected by firms hiring and firing decisions, and thus are truly 
exogenous. Furthermore, this is the first study of its kind to examine the gender aspects on 
unemployment duration for an Arab country. Because low labor force attachment and 
participation for women is more of an issue in Arab countries than the rest of the Middle 
East, this paper will provide key insights to the factors that affect labor market dynamics for 
men and women. For example, many studies have found that factors that increase expected 
wage offers (more schooling, better training, etc.) have a negative effect on the duration of 
unemployment. However, since women in the labor force tend to be more educated than the 
average man in the labor market, it is not clear whether more educated women will have 
longer or shorter spells. Additionally, no one currently knows how the importance of these 
factors will change when macroeconomic conditions change dramatically, as they did in 
Palestine from 2000 to 2004.  
3. Methods and Data  
3.1 Hazard Models 
The job search model provides the framework through which unemployment duration will be 
analyzed (Kiefer 1988; Lancaster 1990).  Let Ti be individual i’s duration, and f(t) be the 
probability distribution of realizations t; the cumulative distribution function is  
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F(t) = Pr(Ti ≤ t)        (1) 
which gives the overall probability that the spell will last until t.  
∫= t dssftF 0 )()(         (2)  
Alternatively, one would be interested in the survival function which gives the probability 
that the spell (s) is of at least length t; that is 
)(1)( tFtS −=         (3) 
The hazard rate is the rate at which spells are completed after a certain duration: 
)(
)()(
tS
tft =λ          (4) 
A number of hazard functions were fit to the data to check robustness of the results. The 
survival and hazard functions below are estimated using semi-parametric and non-parametric 
methods for the various groups.  
3.2 Employment Benefits in Palestine 
The primary labor market regulations for the West Bank and Gaza Strip are found within the 
Palestinian basic Labor Law of 2002. Although the economy was in a dire condition due to 
Al-Aqsa intifada and the corresponding macroeconomic slump, the Palestinian Authority 
fulfilled a promise to have a basic law that contained labor market regulations. Some of the 
regulations contained within the law are: mandated workweek of 45 hours (not stated as a 
maximum or a minimum), that would be reduced by one hour per day for jobs classified as 
hazardous (Articles 69-70); 12 hour maximum overtime with an overtime premium of time 
and a half (Article 71); two weeks mandatory paid leave (Article 74); fourteen days of sick 
leave at full pay, another fourteen at half pay (Article 79); minimum wages by industry set by 
a wage committee composed of union representatives, employers and government members 
(Articles 86–87); ten weeks of paid maternity leave (Article 103).  Although these are 
codified as part of the basic law, coverage is not universal. In addition to their being informal 
sector work (casual selling, working off the books, etc.), many employers simply do not 
provide the mandated benefits.  
The 2004 Work Conditions Survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
contains information on benefits provided by employers as well as potential hazardous 
conditions in the work place. This survey is a supplement to the Fourth Quarter 2004 Labor 
Force Surveys and contains the same identifying variables as the labor force surveys. Table 1 
shows the occurrence of employee benefits and union membership according to three 
occupational categories. These are fairly coarse occupational categories. This was necessary 
because of the relatively small sample size for many of these questions. While the overall 
survey contains 15,000 observations, most of the survey questions were answered by less 
than 1,000 workers. The three occupational categories are managers and professionals, semi-
skilled or skilled craftsmen, and elementary occupations.1 Over the nearly 1,000 respondents 
to questions about benefits, roughly one third are in each of these three categories. 
                                                          
1 The Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) contains two different occupational categories. The first is based 
upon international standard occupational categories and the other is a one-digit category specific to the PLFS. 
The second variable is coded as follows 1=Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers, 2=Professionals, 
Technical, Associates, and Clerks, 3=Service, Shop and Market Workers, 4= Skilled Agriculture and Fishery 
Workers, 5=Craft and Related Trade Workers, 6= Plant and Machine Operators and Assembly workers, 
7=Elementary Occupations. For the categories in this paper. Professionals=1 and 2; 3-6= Skilled and Semi-
Skilled; 7= Elementary Occupations. 
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Table 1 shows that there is a wide disparity between occupations concerning benefits. While 
over 80% of professionals have annual paid vacation and sick leave, less than 30% of semi-
skilled occupations and basic occupations have these benefits. When it comes to women’s 
specific benefits that are mandated in the 2004 Labor Law, the distinction is just as great. 
While nearly half of professional women have paid maternity leave, only 6% of semi-skilled 
and 14% of basic occupations have this benefit. Not surprisingly, there is a greater degree of 
job stability for professional occupations, wages are paid more regularly and there are more 
incentives related to productivity. The main difference in many of these occupations comes 
from the fact that while over three quarters of professional jobs are covered by a written 
contract, this is true for only 15% of semi-skilled work and only 28% of basic work. Not 
surprisingly, professionals are also more likely to be a union member, but the difference is 
not great enough to explain all of the difference in benefits. 
Table 2 shows employee benefit coverage by industry group. The five industry groups 
included in this table are agriculture, manufacturing, construction, commerce and other 
services. The bulk (80%) of the final group is made up of workers for the Palestinian 
National Authority and UNRWA. This table shows dramatically different rates of receiving 
employee benefits. While only 8% of agricultural and construction workers receive paid 
vacation nearly 80% of services workers do. Likewise, there is nearly 50% coverage for 
maternity benefits in the services sector compared to less than 10% in most other sectors. 
This is largely correlated with the much higher incidence of a formal contract (80%) that we 
observe in the services sector. Besides, services, manufacturing and commerce workers 
receive relatively more benefits than do either agricultural or construction workers. This is 
despite the fact that construction workers tend to have the greatest rate of unionization (46%) 
of all the sectors of the economy. 
3.3 Labor Force Survey Data 
The primary data used to analyze unemployment duration is the Palestinian Labor Force 
Survey (PLFS) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While labor force data is available going 
back to 1995, this study covers the time-period from 1999 to 2004.  The shortened period of 
the study is to be able to link households and individuals between quarters. Since the survey 
uses a quarterly rotating structure where each household is in the survey for two quarters, out 
of the survey for two quarters and then back in, these short panels can be used to develop 
better measures of the length of unemployment spells.  
3.4 Labor Force Trends 1999-2004 
Figures 1–3 show the quarterly trend in several labor market aggregates for men in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip from 1999 to 2003. Figure 1 shows the unemployment rate. The advent 
of Al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 led to a sharp rise in the unemployment rate in both 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip between the 3rd and 4th quarters of that year—increasing by 
more than 20 percentage points. For most of these years, the unemployment rate of the two 
regions track each other fairly closely, with only a couple of exceptions. The first is that from 
2001 through 2002 the unemployment rate leveled off in the West Bank, while rising in 2002 
in the Gaza Strip. Second, in 2003, West Bank unemployment rose sharply while 
unemployment in Gaza remained the same, resulting in West Bank unemployment rising 
higher than Gaza Strip unemployment for the only time during these years.2  
 Figure 2 shows the change in labor force participation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for 
men from 1999 to 2003. One of the main points of this paper is to see to what degree workers 
                                                          
2 Personal communication with Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) officials and a researcher hired to 
examine this anomaly indicates that this is not due to an error in the data. The data’s validity has been checked 
internally and appears to be consistent with stated PCBS methodology. 
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and households drop out of the work force during economic crises. The first issue to note is 
that the labor force participation in Gaza decreased rapidly after the beginning of the intifada. 
In the West Bank the decline was much more gradual until 2002, when labor force 
participation fell from 67% to 61% of the population. During this time, the West Bank’s labor 
force participation rate fell as low as Gaza’s for the only time during this period.  
Figure 3 depicts the employment to population ratio of these Palestinian men from 1999 to 
2003. Since this measure is not biased by discouraged workers (as is the unemployment rate), 
and is not affected by added workers (as is the labor force participation rate), this measure 
gives a cleaner overall snapshot of the health of the labor market. While there was a clear 
decrease in employment in both regions during this time, the volatility of this measure is less 
than that of the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate. Employment 
dropped by over 20 percentage points during the first months of the intifada in both regions. 
In 2001 employment then leveled off, only to fall briefly in 2002. After that time, 
employment rose unsteadily for another year and a half. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the labor force trends for Palestinian women from 1999 to 2004. Two 
trends are particularly worth noting. First, while there was initially a sharp rise in 
unemployment among Palestinian women, this dissipated fairly quickly. Second, since 2001, 
the labor force participation rate for Palestinian women has been growing fairly steadily. It is 
worth noting that recent releases of preliminary results from the 2007 Palestinian census has 
noted a fall in Palestinian fertility rates, and the two events may be related to one another. 
4. Results 
4.1 Non-Parametric Survival Functions 
This section describes how survival functions differ by economic and background 
characteristics of workers during the 2001 to 2004.  Years 1999 and 2000 were excluded 
from the remainder of the analysis because of the change in unemployment from the intifada. 
Figures 6-12 depict Kaplan Meier survival functions, which show the probability of not 
leaving unemployment after a given amount of time. The functions presented in this section 
will not control for any other characteristics of the workers, so they should be seen as 
somewhat descriptive, but they highlight how the duration of unemployment differs by 
worker characteristics. Since one of the primary issues that we are examining in this paper is 
the difference by gender, figure 6 shows the survival function for men and women. As seen in 
this figure, women have a much higher probability of remaining unemployed. For most of the 
period, the survival rate (still being unemployed) is nearly 25 percentage points higher for 
women than for men. 
Figures 7-9 look at specific economic and demographic variables of men and the degree to 
which they help determine survival rates. Figure 7 shows survival rates of men by 
occupation, where occupations are defined as Managers/Professionals, Semi-Skilled and 
Basic Occupations. These are the same groupings that were used for defining benefit 
coverage rates above and will be used throughout the rest of the paper. Figures 7 shows that 
survival rates for Basic Occupations are significantly higher than those of both Semi-Skilled 
and Professional occupations. While 75% of unemployed men in basic occupations are still 
unemployed one year later, nearly all unemployed men from other occupations have been 
reemployed. Figure 8 shows a similar graph for industries. In this graph, the only industry 
that stands out is the services industry which has a much greater survival rate compared to 
any other sector of the economy. Finally, figure 9 shows the survival rate by marital status. 
Married men are somewhat more likely to exit unemployment sooner than single men, but 
divorced and widowed men are very slow to be reemployed.  
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Figures 10-12 show the Kaplan Meier survival estimates for women by occupation, industry 
and marital status. Figure 10 shows how unemployment duration is related to major 
occupational groups of Professional, Semi-Skilled and Basic occupations. In this figure, we 
can see that unemployment duration is considerably longer for Basic occupations. Managers 
are the quickest to leave unemployment, with only slightly quicker exit rates than Semi-
Skilled workers. Figure 11 shows survival rates by industry. In this figure, we see that 
workers formerly employed in agriculture and services showed much slower exiting from 
unemployment than those in any other industry. After 20 months, 60% of workers from 
agriculture and industry were still unemployed while only 30% of those from other sectors 
were still without employment. Figure 12 shows how marital status affects unemployment 
duration. Married women are more likely to remain unemployed compared to single women, 
though the difference is not as great as the differences by occupation or industry. Some 75% 
of married women had not yet found work by 20 months, while only 60% of never married 
women were still unemployed at that point.  
4.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
Table 3 presents results from the Cox proportional hazard regression models. These are 
maximum likelihood models that estimate the effect of covariates on the probability of 
leaving unemployment relative to some baseline hazard. While the baseline hazard is not 
actually estimated, one can get a sense of the covariates’ effects by comparing the hazard 
ratios to one. If the dependent variable is categorical—as most of the variables in table 3 
are—then being in that category increases the probability of leaving unemployment 
compared to the omitted category if the value is greater than one, and decreases the 
probability of leaving unemployment if the value is less than one. For example, a value of 0.9 
implies that being in that category (say, aged 20 to 24) reduces your probability of leaving 
unemployment by 10% compared to being in the omitted category (15 to 19 years old).  
The findings from this table imply that economic and demographic factors affect survival 
rates and that the effects of these factors differ, in some cases, between men and women. 
While hazard rates get smaller for older age groups for both men and women, the age at 
which they begin to decline differs by gender. For women, the youngest age group (15 to 19 
year olds) is more likely to leave unemployment than are 20 to 24 year-olds or any other 
group. In fact, the youngest women are twice as likely to leave unemployment than women 
who are 45 and older. For men, workers aged 20 to 44 are more likely to leave 
unemployment than the very youngest workers. However, the 20 to 24 year olds are more 
likely to have their unemployment spells end than are the 25 to 29 year-olds and older 
workers. Education has a similar effect on duration for men and women. Specifically, each 
additional year of education decreases the probability of leaving unemployment when 
educational rates are low. In results not reported here, we find that women with less than 9 
years of schooling had the shortest duration and women with a college degree had the longest 
unemployment duration. For men, those with 9 to 12 years of schooling had the longest 
unemployment spells while those with college degrees had the shortest spells. 
Unemployment duration differs substantially by occupation, but the effects of occupation are 
fairly similar for men and women. Managers and Professionals (the omitted occupational 
category) had the shortest spells as both Semi-Skilled and Basic occupations workers had a 
lower probability of leaving spells. Specifically, Semi-Skilled occupations workers were less 
than 50% as likely to leave an unemployment spell in any period compared to Managers. 
Basic occupations workers were less than 25% as likely to leave unemployment compared to 
Managers. These findings are similar between men and women with women more adversely 
affected by being in a basic occupation. 
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Unemployment duration also differs by industry. In table 3, the agricultural sector is the 
omitted category. For men, each occupation, except for services, had shorter unemployment 
duration than agriculture. Workers from the services sector were less than one tenth as likely 
to leave unemployment as workers from other sectors. Women in the services sector also had 
longer unemployment spells, but those in agriculture had the longest spells.  
Despite the relatively harsher economic conditions in Gaza compared to the West Bank, 
workers from Gaza were more likely to leave unemployment than West Bank workers. The 
effect of being a Gaza resident was similar for men and women. Finally, while women were 
less likely to leave unemployment compared to men, the effect of gender was not dramatic, 
and most of the effect (seen in figure 6) is due to differences in occupational and 
demographic factors.  
When plotting these fitted hazard rates, one can see that there is u-shaped duration 
dependence. At first the probability of leaving unemployment increases as time spent 
unemployed increases. At twenty months, however, the probability of leaving unemployment 
at that time reaches a maximum and every month afterwards, the probability of leaving 
unemployment decreases. This u-shaped duration dependences (inverted U-shaped hazard 
function) is similar to that found in Turkey by Tansil and Tasci (2004).  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined unemployment duration in Palestine during Al-Aqsa intifada, from 
2001 to 2004. Non-parametric approaches show that duration patterns differ considerably 
based upon labor market and demographic characteristics. Specifically, women are 
significantly less likely to leave unemployment compared to men, and the difference grows 
over time. Additionally, unemployed men from basic occupations have longer unemployment 
spells, as do men in the services industry.  Finally, single men have longer unemployment 
spells than single women. Women who worked in basic occupations and in both services and 
agriculture experienced longer unemployment spells. Unlike men, women who were married 
had longer spells than single women did. 
Cox proportional hazard models results are presented to demonstrate the relative effect of a 
large number of covariates. Estimates are presented separately for men and women and in a 
pooled sample. These estimates find that older men and women are less likely to leave 
unemployment compared to younger workers. More schooling decreases the probability of 
leaving unemployment up to a point, but after which more schooling increases the probability 
of leaving unemployment. Similar to the descriptive survival rates, we find that while married 
men are more likely to leave unemployment, married women are less likely to leave 
unemployment compared to single women. While being in a basic occupation decreases the 
probability of leaving unemployment for both men and women, workers from the services 
sector leave unemployment more rapidly for women, but less rapidly for men. 
The patterns of these hazard rates do not relate clearly to benefit coverage rates by industry 
and occupation. While managers and professionals are most likely to receive employment 
benefits, they are also the ones to leave unemployment most quickly, even when controlling 
for human capital measures. Based upon industries, however, unemployment survival rates 
are somewhat more in line with the pattern of employment benefits. Specifically, the services 
sector receives substantially more benefits than any other sector. Likewise, workers from the 
services sector are the slowest to find work after becoming unemployed. While this pattern is 
merely suggestive, it does warrant further research into the importance of the relationship 
between benefits coverage and unemployment duration in Palestine.   
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Figure 1: Unemployment for Men in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: 1999-2004 
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Figure 2: Labor Force Participation for West Bank and Gaza Men, 1999-2004 
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Figure 3: Employment to Population Rate, West Bank and Gaza Men, 1999-2004 
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Figure 4 Unemployment for Palestinian Women: 1999-2004 
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Figure 5: Labor Force Participation for Palestinian Women: 1999-2004 
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Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by Gender 
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Figure 7: Survival Estimates by Occupation (Men) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Survival Estimates – Men by Industry  
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Figure 9: Survival Estimates by Marital Status (Men) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Survival Estimates by Occupation (Women) 
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Figure 11: Survival Estimates by Industry (Women) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Survival Estimates by Marital Status (Women) 
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Table 1: Employment Benefits by Occupational Group  
 Professionals 
% 
Semi-skilled 
% 
Basic Occupations 
% 
Annual Paid Vacation 80 20 27  
Paid Sick Leave 85   25   31   
Paid Emergency Vacation 80   21   23   
Paid Maternity Leave 45 6 14   
Grief Leave 81   28   30   
Breast Feeding Hour 30  5   8   
Weekly Day Off 95 69 63   
Rest Period 77   78   73   
Paid in Time 77   57   67   
Regular Wages 89   78   79   
Educational Opportunities 59   14   10   
Stability 77   33   37   
Cash Incentives 43   13   13   
Moral Incentives 71   47   41   
Decision Making 56   32   21   
Written Contract 76   15   28   
Trade Union Member  41  27   31   
Minor Union Member? 14   6   6   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Employment Benefits by Industry Group  
 Agriculture 
% 
Manufacturing 
% 
Construction 
% 
Commerce 
% 
Services 
% 
Annual Paid Vacation 8  25   8   25   78   
Paid Sick Leave 16   27   5   36   83   
Paid Emergency Vacation 4   18   7   35   76   
Paid Maternity Leave 0   6   2   8   45   
Grief Leave 20   28   10   41   78   
Breast Feeding Hour 0  5 2 5 29 
Weekly Day Off 24   80   48   68  95   
Rest Period 6   81  77   71   79   
Paid in Time 72   54   49   65   79   
Regular Wages 88   78   70   80  89   
Educational Opportunities 0   12   4.8   19  54   
Stability 8   34   12   49  77   
Cash Incentives 8   14   6   21  38   
Moral Incentives 16   51   35  49   68   
Decision Making 8   27   27   44   49   
Written Contract 4   14   6   16   79   
Trade Union Member  19   36   46   31   32   
Minor union Member? 3   8   6   8   10   
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Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Unemployment Spells 
 Full Sample Men Women 
 (fail= spell end) (fail= spell end) (fail= spell end) 
Age 20-24 1.333*** 1.050*** 0.972* 
 (0.056) (0.053) (0.51) 
Age 25-29 1.174*** 0.901*** 0.771* 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.41) 
Age 30-34 1.175*** 0.870*** 0.715* 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.38) 
Age 35-39 1.163*** 0.831*** 0.913* 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.49) 
Age 40-44 1.023*** 0.743*** 0.817* 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.45) 
Age 45+ 0.976*** 0.651*** 0.499* 
 (0.056) (0.043) (0.29) 
Yrs of Schooling 0.973*** 0.964*** 0.772*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.054) 
Schooling2 1.001*** 1.002*** 1.009*** 
 (0.00079) (0.00084) (0.0032) 
Married 0.993*** 1.168*** 0.631*** 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.082) 
Semi-Skill Occupation 0.327*** 0.404*** 0.453*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.098) 
Basic Occupation 0.157*** 0.228*** 0.00983*** 
 (0.0080) (0.013) (0.0025) 
Manufacturing  1.133*** 1.178*** 1.421*** 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.46) 
Construction 1.335*** 1.284*** 1.325 
 (0.048) (0.046) (1.39) 
Commerce  1.148*** 1.178*** 1.107** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.52) 
Services 0.0993*** 0.0764*** 1.140*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.34) 
Gaza 1.285*** 1.269*** 1.046*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.15) 
Female 0.993***   
 (0.061)   
    
No. Obs 29,780 2,367 27,422 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  
 
